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MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE ADELMAN; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF  
SUBJECT: NITZE-KVITSINSKIY LUNCHEON, 26 JANUARY 1983

1. THIS IS INF-366. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR NITZE MET WITH AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKIY OVER LUNCH ON 26 JANUARY. CONVERSATION AFFORDED NITZE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN REASONS FOR ROSTOW RESIGNATION AND ASSERT

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CONTINUED SUPPORT BY PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SCHULTZ. KVITSINSKIY EXPRESSED REGRET OVER RECENT LEAKS BY US GOVERNMENT AND CONCERN THAT CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN COMPROMISED. NITZE ASKED HOW BEST TO PROCEED FROM THIS POINT.

3. KVITSINSKIY NOTED CLYNE/GRININ CONVERSATION IN WHICH US SIDE HAD PROPOSED A SINGLE PLENARY PER WEEK WITH TWO ADDITIONAL WORKING GROUPS TO BE ESTABLISHED. HE ASSERTED THERE WAS NO POINT TO FORMING ADDITIONAL GROUPS SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DISCUSS UNTIL THE US MOVED. KVITSINSKIY REPEATED THIS IN RESPONSE TO NITZE ASSERTION THAT IN THE US VIEW IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON ALL MATTERS, CENTRAL AND SECONDARY.

4. NITZE OBSERVED THAT ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT SUGGESTED PROGRESS TOWARD COMMON GROUND, BUT A MORE PRECISE UNDERSTANDING WAS NECESSARY. IN NITZE'S VIEW, TWO IMPORTANT POINTS HAD BEEN MADE: THAT THE SOVIET SIDE COULD AGREE TO A MISSILE CEILING EQUAL TO BRITISH AND FRENCH MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES (PRESENTLY 162) AND TO AN EQUAL CEILING ON MEDIUM RANGE AIRCRAFT. WERE THESE SEPERATE CEILINGS? KVITSINSKIY RESPONDED NEGATIVELY; THE AIRCRAFT CEILING WAS TO BE INTERPRETED IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR 300 PROPOSAL. NITZE SAID ONE COULD NOT INFER THIS FROM THE WORDS IN ANDROPOV'S SPEECH. THIS REINFORCED HIS ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND SOVIET PROPOSALS WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE SPECIFIC DETAILS SURROUNDING THE PROPOSAL.

5. KVITSINSKIY REITERATED THAT ANDROPOV HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT MOVE AND THE US WOULD NOW HAVE TO MOVE FROM THE ZERO/ZERO POSITION INTO WHICH IT WAS LOCKED. NITZE DENIED THAT THE US WAS LOCKED INTO ZERO/ZERO. THE US CONSIDERS THIS THE BEST OUTCOME BUT WAS NOT WEDDED TO AN ALL-OR-NOTHING POSITION. THE US IS PREPARED TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY ANY PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIETS WHICH PROVIDES FOR NATO SECURITY INTERESTS AND IS BASED UPON EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES.

6. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT ANDROPOV, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD BEEN IN THE CHAIN OF DECISION PRIOR TO BREZHNEV'S DEATH, WAS NOW IN A NEW POSITION. NOW THAT HE IS FORMALLY IN CHARGE,

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HE CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANOTHER MOVE UNTIL THERE IS MOVEMENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. THE LEAKS ABOUT THE EXPLORATORY PACKAGE HAD BEEN DAMAGING IN MOSCOW AND MAKE IT RELUCTANT TO AUTHORIZE HIM ANY FLEXIBILITY UNLESS WE MOVE FIRST.

7. KVITSINSKIY OFFERED TO PROVIDE A HINT AS TO HOW TO PROGRESS FROM HERE. WERE THE AMERICAN SIDE TO SUGGEST HOW TO DEAL WITH AIRCRAFT, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER SOMETHING IN RESPONSE. HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. HE ALSO SAW NO POINT IN DISCUSSING CBMS OR VERIFICATION (IN WORKING GROUPS) AT THIS POINT. NITZE CONTENDED THAT UNDER ANY AGREEMENT, SYSTEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED. D Y SHOULD VERIFICATION MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS, FOR INSTANCE, NOT BE DISCUSSED? KVITSINSKIY RETORTED THAT THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL THE DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

8. KVITSINSKIY REASSERTED THAT THERE CANNOT BE AN AGREEMENT UNLESS THE SIDES AGREE TO COMPENSATION FOR UK/FR SYSTEMS. TO NITZE'S OBSERVATION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NO DOUBT AWARE OF MITTERAND'S STATEMENTS ON THAT SUBJECT, KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD INFORMED THE FRENCH THAT THEY (THE FRENCH) HAD NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT THE MATTER; THESE WERE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. NITZE SAID THAT WAS JUST THE POINT; THE US COULD NEVER ACCEPT UNEQUAL LIMITATIONS BASED ON COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS; TO DO SO WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ALLIANCE AND WE WERE NOT ABOUT TO DO THAT. KVITSINSKIY SAID THE BRITISH HAD WRITTEN THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF UK NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, AND THAT THE BRITISH CONSIDERED

SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS AS STRATEGIC.

9. HE ADDED IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE NO CONTROLS ON MISSILES IN THE FAR EAST. NITZE RESPONDED THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE PART OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH RESULTED IN EXPORTING THE PROBLEM OF THESE MISSILES FROM EUROPE TO THE FAR EAST. KVITSINSKIY OBSERVED THAT PREVENTING WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSILES WOULD NOT SOLVE THAT PROBLEM; THEY COULD SEND NEWLY PRODUCED MISSILES THERE. NITZE REFUTED THIS, SAYING A CEILING WOULD SOLVE BOTH PROBLEMS.

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10. NITZE INTRODUCED THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES. WHY COULD THESE NOT BE DISCUSSED? THE US BELIEVES A LIMITATION ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, IN ADDITION TO BEING QUALITATIVE NOT MERELY QUANTITATIVE, SHOULD BE SYSTEM SPECIFIC, SINCE THE SOVIETS ALTERNATELY DENY ITS EXISTENCE OR ASCRIBE A RANGE OF 350 KM TO THE SS-23. THE SOVIET 500/1000 KM RANGE DEMARCATION IS THUS UNSATISFACTORY.

11. AT THIS, KVITSINSKIY AGAIN ASSERTED HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS ANY OF THESE MATTERS UNTIL THE US MOVED FIRST. THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT NEED AN AGREEMENT AS MUCH AS THE US DOES. NITZE SAID THAT SOUNDED AS THOUGH THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO STALEMATE THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THEY HAD DEPLOYED THEIR MISSILES AND WE HAD YET TO DO SO. TO KVITSINSKIY'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER NITZE WAS HOPEFUL, NITZE REPLIED THAT NOTHING KVITSINSKIY HAD SAID MADE HIM HOPEFUL, BUT NEVERTHELESS HE WAS CONFIDENT. NITZE

END OF MESSAGE

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